战略与国际研究中心-PONARS-Policy-Memo-236_4页_80kb

Ukraine on the Eve of Parliamentary Elections: Internal Trends and Security Implications

Core Content

The document provides an analysis of Ukraine's parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2002, focusing on the internal political dynamics and their implications for Ukraine's security and reform trajectory. It outlines the electoral framework, the key political players, and the potential risks and outcomes of the election.

Election Rules

• The new election law was adopted by the Rada on October 18, 2001, and signed by President Leonid Kuchma on November 2.
• A mixed majoritarian-proportional system was retained, with 225 deputies elected in single-member districts and 225 by party lists, requiring a 4 percent electoral threshold.
• The campaign period was reduced from 180 days to 90 days, starting on January 1, 2002, and ending on March 31, 2002.
• Parties must register at least a year before the elections, and those with previous election results or parliamentary factions are eligible to participate in district electoral commissions.

Key Political Players and Their Chances

The Left

• Communists: Expected to secure 15–20 percent of the vote, primarily from the older generation.
• Socialist Party (led by Oleksander Moroz): Anticipated to narrowly meet the 4 percent threshold with about 5 percent of the vote.
• Progressive Socialist Party (led by Natalia Vitrenko): An ultraleft populist party that previously split the left vote and drew support from Moroz.

Ideologically Amorphous Propresidential Center

• Bloc For United Ukraine: Composed of five parties, including the People's Democratic Party, Labor Ukraine, Party of Regions, Agrarian Party, and Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. They are considered the "oligarch layer" and are expected to get 4–9 percent of the vote.
• SDPU(u) (Social Democratic Party of Ukraine): A party with a "social-democratic" name but controlled by business tycoons. It is expected to get around 4 percent of the vote.
• Green Party: Could gain up to 5 percent due to its attractive title and support from banking groups.

Center-Right

• Our Ukraine (led by Yuri Yushchenko): A coalition of national-democratic parties and mavericks, with an expected vote share of 15–17 percent, possibly up to 25 percent.
• Yulia Tymoshenko's Block: Expected to gain up to 5 percent, including her party "Bat'kivshchyna" and remnants of the anti-Kuchma Forum of National Salvation.
• Other Parties: Include the Democratic Union, Yabluko (Apple), Unity (led by Kyiv mayor Oleksander Omelchenko), People's Rukh for Unity, Women for Future, and a potential "new liberal movement" backed by well-to-do businessmen and the presidential entourage.

Electoral Risks

1. Underdevelopment of the Party System:

   • The party system remains underdeveloped, with real decision-making concentrated within the president's entourage.
   • Key figures like Volodymyr Lytvyn and Prime Minister Anatoli Kinakh are aligned with the For United Ukraine bloc, which may influence the election outcomes.

2. Unbalanced External Influence:

   • Oligarchs control most private media and TV channels, with some influenced by Russian capital.
   • Russian PR specialists are actively involved in the campaign, including "Nikkolo M" for For United Ukraine and Gleb Pavlovski for SDPU(u).
   • This external influence may hinder the development of independent Ukrainian institutions and decision-making processes.

Possible Scenarios

• Scenario 1: Oligarch Parties Win:

  • A victory for the oligarch parties would result in the continuation of undefined policies.
  • This could lead to increased economic dependence on Russia and potential coordination of foreign and security policies with Russia.
  • It is considered a plausible long-term scenario given Russia's cautious approach and economic leverage.

• Scenario 2: Our Ukraine Gains Significant Support:

  • If Our Ukraine secures up to 20 percent of the vote, it could form a reform-oriented coalition with other reform-minded blocs.
  • This would challenge the dominance of the oligarch parties and create a more democratic and pro-European political landscape.
  • However, this scenario requires internal compromises and cooperation among the national democrats and other reformists.

Conclusion

The document emphasizes the importance of developing a counterinfluence system and promoting democratic and pro-European standards to counter the influence of the oligarchic and propresidential forces. It highlights the need for Western support in building a new generation of decision-makers through university, media, and NGO-oriented programs.