战略与国际研究中心-US-Strategy,-Force-Plans,-and-the-FY2010-Defense-Budget_10页_368kb

U.S. Strategy, Force Plans, and the FY2010 Defense Budget Summary

Core Content

The FY2010 Defense Budget, as outlined by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, reflects a strategic shift in U.S. military priorities and force structure. However, the budget and associated program changes remain uncertain and underdeveloped, raising significant questions about the long-term implications for U.S. defense capabilities and budget sustainability.

Main Objectives

Secretary Gates emphasized the need to reshape the defense establishment through interconnected changes, focusing on the following key objectives:

• Reaffirm commitment to the all-volunteer force: Ensuring the protection and proper funding of military personnel.
• Rebalance defense programs: Aligning capabilities with current and future threats, including irregular warfare and hybrid conflicts.
• Reform procurement and acquisition processes: To improve efficiency, reduce costs, and enhance readiness.

Key Areas and Decisions

1. Manpower and End Strength

• The budget includes a nearly $11 billion increase to support the growth of the military end strength, particularly in the Army and Marines, while halting reductions in the Air Force and Navy.
• A shift is proposed from contractor support to full-time government employees, aiming to reduce the contractor workforce from 39% to 26%.
• Over 13,000 new civil servants are to be hired in FY2010, with up to 30,000 over the next five years.
• However, the budget does not clearly define the desired end strength, affordability, or linkages to a detailed force plan.

2. Military Entitlements

• Military entitlements, such as healthcare and family support programs, are expected to grow, with a $13 billion increase in base budget funding.
• These entitlements have led to rising costs per soldier, threatening the ability to sustain the required military end strength.
• The budget aims to institutionalize these programs within the base budget, moving away from supplemental funding.

3. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

• ISR funding is increased by $2 billion in the base budget, including the fielding of 50 Predator-class UAV orbits by FY11.
• Manned ISR capabilities, such as turbo-prop aircraft, are to be expanded.
• Research and development on new ISR platforms is initiated.
• The $26 billion Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program is terminated, with the purchase of two more AEHF satellites instead.
• The potential vulnerabilities of ISR systems to cyber and space warfare are not adequately addressed.

4. Army and Ground Forces

• The Army will stop the growth of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) at 45 instead of 48, while maintaining the planned increase in end strength.
• The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program is significantly restructured, with the vehicle component canceled due to cost and design concerns.
• The Army will re-evaluate its vehicle modernization needs and re-launch a competitive bidding process.
• No detailed future size, structure, or readiness plans for ground forces are provided.

5. Aircraft Procurement and Force Size

• Helicopter capacity is to be increased, with a focus on recruiting and training more crews.
• Special operations capabilities will be enhanced with more personnel and specialized aircraft.
• The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter purchase is increased from 14 to 30 aircraft in FY2010, with funding rising from $6.8 billion to $11.2 billion.
• The Air Force will retire 250 of its oldest tactical fighters and end F-22 production at 187.
• The VH-71 presidential helicopter program is terminated due to cost overruns and delays.
• The CSAR-X helicopter program is also terminated due to acquisition issues.

6. Fleet Modernization and Ship Building

• LCS procurement is increased from two to three ships in FY2010, with a goal of acquiring 55 in total.
• JHSV chartering is increased to four ships.
• Aegis ships are converted for ballistic missile defense, with an additional $200 million allocated.
• The Ohio-class submarine replacement program begins in FY2010.
• The Navy’s carrier program is shifted to a five-year build cycle.
• The CG-X and amphibious ship programs are delayed for further review and cost analysis.

7. Nuclear Posture

• No specific decisions are made on nuclear forces, with the review process ongoing during the QDR and Nuclear Posture Review.

8. Missile Defense

• The program is restructured to focus on rogue states and theater missile threats.
• Ground-based interceptors in Alaska are not increased.
• The ABL and MKV programs are canceled, with funding shifted to THAAD and SM-3 systems.
• The overall missile defense budget is reduced by $1.4 billion.

9. Interagency Coordination

• There is no discussion of interagency coordination between the Department of Defense, State Department, and Homeland Security, despite calls for a more integrated civil-military strategy.

10. Cost Containment and Procurement Reform

• The budget emphasizes the need for reform in the procurement and contracting process.
• Three key steps are proposed:
  • Stop over-budget and over-capability programs.
  • Ensure reasonable requirements and mature technology.
  • Realistically estimate costs and provide stable funding and oversight.
• The need for a more flexible and agile acquisition system is highlighted, with calls for ending the long, complex procurement cycle.

Unanswered Questions

Despite the outlined changes, many questions remain:

• What is the strategic goal for U.S. warfighting capabilities?
• How will force plans and budgets be structured for the future?
• What is the proper balance between military, civilian, and contractor manpower?
• How will the future size and structure of U.S. ground and air forces be determined?
• What is the long-term plan for naval modernization and shipbuilding?
• How will the budget address the long-term modernization of the defense industrial base?
• What is the role of the U.S. in global missile defense and how will it evolve?

Conclusion

The FY2010 Defense Budget outlines a series of strategic and operational shifts, but it lacks a coherent, long-term force plan and budget architecture. While some one-time fixes and incremental changes are proposed, they do not resolve the underlying issues of cost overruns, procurement inefficiencies, and the need for a more integrated national security strategy. The budget represents a starting point for reform, but further detailed planning and interagency coordination are essential to ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of the U.S. defense posture.