2011年-世界发展银行全球_Fiscal_Responsibility_Framework_in_Croatia___Lessons_from_the_Past_Rules_for_the_Future_24页_1mb

报告摘要

Summary of "Fiscal Responsibility Framework in Croatia: Lessons from the Past, Rules for the Future"

Core Content

The document outlines the development and implementation of a Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) in Croatia, with the aim of ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability, discipline, and transparency. It reviews Croatia's fiscal management, analyzes international experience with fiscal frameworks, and provides recommendations for improving the FRL.

Main Views and Key Information

A. Introduction

The Croatian Parliament enacted the FRL in November 2010 to enhance fiscal management and stability.
Croatia has made progress in aligning its public finances with EU standards, including adopting INTOSAI auditing standards and IPSAS accounting and reporting standards.
Despite these efforts, fiscal targets are often missed, and fiscal discipline remains weak.
The global financial crisis (2009) exposed structural weaknesses in Croatia's fiscal system, with high public debt (over 50% of GDP) and rigid spending levels (over 44% of GDP).
The Maastricht criteria for joining the euro zone (deficit < 3% of GDP, debt < 60% of GDP) are under threat due to these issues.

B. Croatia's Public Finances and Budgetary Process

Fiscal rules exist in legislation, but they are not consistently enforced.
The 2008 Organic Budget Act introduced a three-year rolling budget and a rule to control the debt-to-GDP ratio, but it has not been applied.
Fiscal impact assessments (FIAs) are required for all legislative proposals, but they are not always respected.
Parliamentary involvement is minimal, with little time for analysis and amendments are rarely accepted.
Local and regional governments (LGUs) operate independently but are subject to central government controls through medium-term budget instructions and borrowing limits.
Deficit deviations are common, with planned fiscal targets often not respected, especially for the first year of the three-year rolling budget.

C. International Experience

Global fiscal authorities often face deficit bias and procyclical behavior.
Fiscal responsibility frameworks have proven to be effective in improving policy credibility, investor confidence, and macroeconomic stability.
The fiscal rule index and cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) are positively correlated in the EU27.
Key elements of successful FRLs include:
- Fiscal policy rules (e.g., fixed targets for fiscal aggregates)
- Fiscal procedural rules (e.g., transparency and accountability in budgeting)
- Surveillance mechanisms (e.g., independent bodies to monitor compliance)
- Enforceable sanctions (e.g., wage freezes, dismissal, etc.)
- Social and political consensus for long-term effectiveness

D. Fiscal Responsibility Framework for Croatia

The temporary fiscal rule should be based on expenditure-based consolidation with clear annual spending reduction targets.
This rule should remain in place until the general government balance is achieved to help reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio.
For the longer term, a cyclically adjusted balanced budget is recommended, but it requires technical expertise and data availability.
The fiscal rule and reporting should follow ESA 95 definitions to align with Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact criteria.
Incorporating EU project costs into the fiscal rule is important to avoid large adjustments at EU accession.
An independent authority should be established to monitor compliance with the fiscal rule, the three-year budget plan, and fiscal forecasts.
Enforceable sanctions are necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the FRL.
The FRL should be binding for future governments and enacted as an organic law with a two-thirds majority.
Macro forecasting accuracy has been a major issue, contributing to missed fiscal targets.
Political commitment is essential for the success of any fiscal rule, as rules alone may not be sufficient.

Tables and Figures

Figure 1 shows the cyclically adjusted balance in Croatia, indicating the procyclical nature of fiscal policy.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 highlight the inaccuracy in planning and forecasting and the potential loss of credibility in fiscal plans.
Figure 4 illustrates the overestimation of growth in the PEP, which affected deficit projections.
Figure 5 demonstrates the positive correlation between the fiscal rule index and CAPB in the EU27.

Recommendations

Implement a temporary fiscal rule focused on expenditure-based consolidation.
Consider a cyclically adjusted balanced budget in the long run, provided it can be effectively implemented.
Use ESA 95 definitions for fiscal reporting and rule implementation.
Include EU project costs in the fiscal rule to avoid future adjustments.
Establish a legally and effectively independent authority to monitor compliance.
Enforce meaningful and credible sanctions to ensure the FRL is respected.
Enact the FRL as an organic law with a two-thirds majority to ensure it binds future governments.
Improve macroeconomic forecasting and fiscal planning to increase credibility and reduce deviations.
Strengthen political commitment to fiscal targets to ensure long-term success.