2021-05-31-布鲁盖尔研究所-平台合并与反垄断（英文）_46页_584kb

Platform Mergers and Antitrust Summary

Authors: Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos, Marshall Van Alstyne
Date: 2021
Context: This working paper examines the role of platform mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in digital ecosystems, focusing on the GAFAM firms (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft). It addresses competition concerns arising from their market dominance and proposes regulatory reforms.

Key Findings

• Platform Characteristics: Digital platforms thrive on economies of scale, data-driven economies of scope, and network effects, fostering winner-takes-most markets. These forces enable rapid growth through M&As, but can lead to anticompetitive behavior.
• M&A Strategies: GAFAM firms engage extensively in M&As since their inception, with over 800 acquisitions analyzed. Motives include horizontal/vertical expansion, establishing presence, and efficiency gains. Theft of talent (acquihire) and technology transfer are common, but can harm competition through "killer acquisitions" or "kill zone" effects, reducing market entry and venture capital.
• Theories of Harm: Potential antitrust issues include dynamic concerns (e.g., foreclosure, reduced innovation), horizontal/conglomerate mergers that increase market power and restrict consumer choice, and vertical mergers that distort upstream competition and leverage data advantages.

Proposed Regulatory Changes

The paper advocates for an ex-ante regulatory approach with four steps to address M&A competition concerns:

• Ex-ante Regulation: Introduce "in situ rights," allowing users direct access to their raw data on platforms via APIs, to reduce information asymmetry and promote fair competition.
• Differential Regulation: Update priorities for horizontal vs. vertical acquisitions, ensuring equal treatment and transparency.
• Merger Control Updates: Make M&A notifications compulsory for gatekeeper platforms, reverse the burden of proof for high-risk deals, and increase transparency on acquisition terms and strategic intent.
• Dynamic Effect Assessment: Use online experiments, surveys, and forward-looking tools to better evaluate merger impacts, including consumer surplus and network effects, and impose flexible remedies.

Conclusion

Platform M&As significantly drive growth but pose competition risks due to information asymmetry and market power. A combination of ex-ante regulation and updated merger enforcement can mitigate harm, redistribute ecosystem value fairly, and enhance consumer welfare in digital markets.