2007年-世界发展银行全球_Survey_of_Land_and_Real_Estate_Transactions_in_the_Russian_Federation___Statistical_Analysis_of_Selected_Hypotheses_44页_646kb

Summary of "Survey of Land and Real Estate Transactions in the Russian Federation"

Core Content

This paper presents a statistical analysis of land and real estate transactions in the Russian Federation, based on a survey conducted by the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) in 15 regions. The survey aimed to assess businesses' access to land and identify administrative barriers that hinder land privatization. The findings are used to test several hypotheses regarding the impact of pricing policies, administrative procedures, and corruption on land transactions.

Main Hypotheses and Findings

1. Pricing Policy and Land Privatization

• Key Hypothesis: Demand for land is influenced by the pricing policy implemented by sub-national authorities.
• Findings:
  • Regions with lower statutory land buy-out prices have higher rates of land privatization.
  • Even though long-term leases may appear more beneficial, businesses tend to prefer land ownership when prices are low.
  • A shift from higher to lower pricing policies can significantly increase land privatization rates (more than doubling for some regions).

2. Administrative Barriers and Land Leasing

• Key Hypothesis: Businesses often apply to lease land due to higher administrative costs and delays associated with land privatization.
• Findings:
  • Administrative barriers, including delays and frequent refusals, deter land privatization.
  • Long-term leases are less marketable than ownership and are often used as an alternative.
  • Reducing delays by 25% could decrease the proportion of land lease transactions by about 15 percentage points.

3. Sunk Costs and Corruption

• Key Hypothesis: Procedures with sunk costs are longer and more prone to corruption.
• Findings:
  • Sunk cost procedures take about 34% more time than "reversible" ones.
  • These procedures involve a higher share of unofficial payments (about 11% more on average).

4. Tenders and Auctions

• Key Hypothesis: Regions with more land tenders and auctions will have higher rates of land privatization and less corruption.
• Findings:
  • While tenders and auctions are associated with higher privatization rates, there is no clear evidence that they reduce delays or unofficial payments.
  • These mechanisms are still not widely used across the regions.

5. Complexity and Corruption

• Key Hypothesis: Excessively complicated and costly procedures are associated with more frequent unofficial payments.
• Findings:
  • Each additional stage in a procedure increases the percentage of stages involving unofficial payments by about 4 percentage points.
  • Procedure duration does not significantly affect the level of unofficial payments when controlling for complexity and official fees.

6. "Good Connections" and Costs

• Key Hypothesis: Having good connections with government officials reduces costs and delays.
• Findings:
  • While connections may reduce procedure duration, they also increase the fees charged by intermediaries.
  • This suggests that businesses are often forced to pay more to expedite the process.

Key Information

• Survey Scope: Conducted in 15 regions representing all 7 Federal districts, covering 17% of the territory, 33% of the population, and 44% of the GDP.
• Survey Participants:
  • 517 business intermediaries (BIS) who assisted with land and real estate transactions in 2004.
  • 1188 legal entities and sole proprietors (ARCS) who attempted, underwent, or completed land and real estate transactions.
• Land Ownership:
  • Most land of interest to businesses is still owned or controlled by municipal governments.
  • In Moscow City, 100% of land is publicly owned.
  • Rostov Oblast has the highest proportion of land owned by individuals (just under 65%).
• Land Privatization Rates:
  • Among SMEs surveyed in 2005, only 6% owned land.
  • Among firms involved in land transactions, 18% reported ownership rights.
• Land Transaction Procedures:
  • The average number of stages for land privatization is 11, with 8 different agencies and 17 documents.
  • The average duration is 220 days, and the average cost is about 70,000 Rubles (about US$2,400).
  • There is significant variation across regions, with some areas having procedures as short as 50 days and as long as over 400 days.

Policy Implications

• Reduce Administrative Complexity: Simplifying procedures and reducing unnecessary steps can help increase land privatization.
• Maintain Low Buy-Out Prices: Keeping land buy-out prices low encourages privatization and the development of a competitive secondary market.
• Implement "Silent Consent" Policy: A policy requiring written explanations for refusals within a time limit can improve transparency and reduce delays.
• Encourage Tenders and Auctions: These mechanisms should be further promoted but monitored for transparency and fairness.
• Address Fiscal Incentives: Municipalities may need alternative revenue sources, such as enhanced land taxes, to support land privatization without losing fiscal benefits.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that reducing statutory land buy-out prices and eliminating unnecessary administrative barriers are critical to promoting land privatization and improving the efficiency of the land market. It also highlights the need for greater transparency and fairness in procedures, as well as the role of "good connections" in influencing the privatization process. The findings suggest that a more competitive and transparent land market can be achieved through policy reforms that align with market demands and reduce corruption.