布鲁盖尔研究所-欧盟半心半意半导体战略的新方向（英）-2021.7_21页_488kb

Summary of "A New Direction for the European Union's Half-Hearted Semiconductor Strategy"

Core Content

Semiconductors are a fundamental component in modern technology, essential for everything from smartphones to cars. As the global economy becomes increasingly digital, securing semiconductor supply chains has become a critical policy goal, especially in the context of rising geopolitical tensions. The European Union (EU) has recognized the importance of this sector and aims to enhance its strategic autonomy by increasing its role in high-end chip production.

Main Points

• Global Semiconductor Supply Chain: The semiconductor industry is highly concentrated and capital-intensive, with major production concentrated in Asia. The US dominates chip design, while Taiwan (TSMC) and South Korea (Samsung) lead in high-end fabrication. Europe plays a minor role in both production and consumption.

• EU's Strategic Challenges:

  • The EU lacks the financial and technological capacity to compete in high-end chip fabrication.
  • Its current strategy focuses on increasing fabrication capacity, which is not aligned with its relatively low domestic demand.
  • The EU's position in the semiconductor value chain is weak, particularly in design and fabrication, and it relies heavily on external suppliers.

• Industrial Strategy Recommendations:

  • The EU should focus on its strengths in materials and equipment supply, such as ASML, Aixtron, and Riber.
  • Investment in chip design and software R&D would be more effective than a subsidy war for fabrication capacity.
  • The EU should develop policy tools to support industrial policy and leverage its role in global standards through digital regulation.

• US and China's Influence:

  • The US has imposed sanctions on Chinese tech firms to limit their access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
  • China is aggressively pursuing self-sufficiency in semiconductors through state-backed investments and acquisitions, but it still lags behind in advanced manufacturing capabilities.
  • China's semiconductor production is still based on older technologies (e.g., 14 nm nodes), while the US and Asia lead in cutting-edge production.

Key Information

• Market Shares:

  • The US leads in chip design (65% of the market).
  • Taiwan and South Korea dominate high-end fabrication.
  • China is increasing its share in assembly and is rapidly expanding in design and fabrication.
  • Europe accounts for only 2% of design firms and 10% of global production capacities.

• EU's Position:

  • Europe is not a leader in the ICT sector despite its strong R&D investment.
  • The EU's semiconductor industry is fragmented, with limited state support and access to venture capital.
  • The EU's focus on fabrication is misplaced, as the sector is too capital-intensive and dominated by a few players.

• Semiconductor Shortages:

  • The 2020-2021 global semiconductor shortage was driven by increased demand from ICT and automotive sectors, combined with limited production capacity.
  • The shortage highlighted the vulnerabilities of relying on external supply chains and the need for a more strategic approach to semiconductor policy.

• Strategic Autonomy:

  • The EU's goal of improving strategic autonomy is hindered by its limited role in the semiconductor value chain.
  • The EU must balance its desire for self-reliance with the reality that full independence is unlikely, and sustainable supply through diplomacy is also essential.

Conclusion

To improve its position in the semiconductor industry, the EU should shift its focus from fabrication to design and materials, leveraging its existing strengths in innovation and regulation. A more targeted and sustainable strategy, rather than a direct competition with the US and China, is needed to ensure the EU's competitiveness and security in the global semiconductor market.