卡内基国际和平基金会-Contested-Consolidation-of-Power-in-Iraq_30页_1mb

Contested Consolidation of Power in Iraq

Summary

During his second term, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki emerged as a dominant political force in Iraq, largely due to his control over the Iraqi security apparatus and army. Despite several attempts by his opponents to unseat him in 2012, these efforts were unsuccessful, largely due to internal divisions among his rivals. The weak legal framework and lack of effective checks and balances further enabled Maliki's consolidation of power. The article highlights the ongoing political tensions, including the military standoff with the Kurds and the antigovernment protests in Sunni-majority provinces, as key challenges to Maliki's authority.

Key Themes

• Army as a Political Tool: The Iraqi army has played a central role in the consolidation of power, particularly in non-Kurdish provinces, where it is the only central institution present.
• Kurdish Autonomy and Resistance: The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) maintains its own security forces, the peshmerge, and has resisted central government control over disputed territories.
• Political Fragmentation: The lack of a unified opposition and internal divisions within major political blocs, such as Iraqiyya, have weakened their ability to challenge Maliki.
• Legal and Institutional Weakness: Iraq's constitutional and legal framework remains incomplete, contributing to the instability and contestation of power.
• Regional Tensions: The central government's efforts to assert control over the Kurdish regions have led to increased militarization and political unrest in areas like Kirkuk.

Core Content

A Rise to Dominance

Nouri al-Maliki was reappointed as Prime Minister in December 2010, and since then, he has consolidated his power through strategic alliances and control over the security forces. His ability to command the army and influence the Ministry of Interior has allowed him to dominate the political landscape.

• The 2010 elections saw Maliki's coalition, the Shia State of Law, secure second place behind the Sunni-dominated Iraqiyya.
• To form a government, Maliki had to negotiate with Iraqiyya and the Kurds, agreeing to share executive power and acknowledge Kurdish claims.
• However, the promised power-sharing never materialized, and Maliki continued to centralize authority.

Political Dynamics

• The 2005 constitution aimed to create a decentralized state with shared power between Baghdad and the provinces.
• The legal framework, however, remained incomplete and weak, allowing political leaders to manipulate power structures.
• Political parties, including the Sadrist Trend and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, faced challenges in maintaining influence and delivering services, leading to their decline.

Consolidation of Power

• Maliki expanded his control over the army and security ministries, effectively acting as both the defense and interior minister.
• The army's presence in the provinces allowed the central government to exert influence over security decisions, weakening provincial autonomy.
• The Kurdish peshmerge forces remain a key counterbalance, maintaining control over their own region and disputed territories.

The Army and Consolidation of Power

• The Iraqi army, created during the U.S. occupation, has become a central instrument in the power struggle.
• De-Baathification policies and ethnic/sectarian quotas led to the politicization of the army.
• Maliki reversed some de-Baathification measures to reintegrate former officers and strengthen his military ties.

Extending the Army's Reach

• The army has been deployed in all provinces except the Kurdish ones, giving Baghdad significant leverage over security and governance.
• In the northern provinces, the army's presence has undermined local governance and led to protests and demands for autonomy.
• In the southern provinces, the army has reinforced central authority, leading to cooperation between local police and army divisions.

The Army in the Disputed Territories

• Disputed areas like Kirkuk are under Kurdish control, with peshmerge forces and Kurdish police deployed.
• The central government has attempted to assert control through the Dijla Operations Command, which has led to increased tensions.
• Arab leaders in Kirkuk are caught between supporting Sunni protests and maintaining ties with Maliki to counter Kurdish influence.

Main Political Groups and Their Roles

• Iraqiyya: A Sunni-dominated coalition that lost influence due to internal divisions and inability to challenge Maliki's authority.
• State of Law (Maliki's coalition): Dominated by Shia groups, including the Sadrist Trend, and has maintained a strong grip on power.
• Kurdistan Alliance: Includes Kurdish political parties and has secured key cabinet positions and autonomy.
• Kurdish peshmerge: The only security force in the Kurdish region, serving as a counterbalance to the central government.

Policy Recommendations

• Strengthen Legal Framework: Political groups should invest in improving Iraq's legal institutions to prevent the continuous cycle of political crisis.
• Avoid Security-Based Political Struggles: The use of security forces for political purposes should be avoided to ensure stability.
• Build Inclusive Government: Political groups must work together to form a more inclusive and representative government.
• Engage with Disenfranchised Citizens: Political leaders should reach out to communities that feel excluded or underrepresented to build trust and support.

Conclusion

The consolidation of power by Nouri al-Maliki has been facilitated by both his control over the security apparatus and the fragmentation of his opponents. The legal and institutional weaknesses in Iraq, combined with the army's central role in governance, have contributed to a climate of political instability. The tensions between the central government and the Kurdish region, as well as the rising protests in Sunni-majority provinces, highlight the deepening contest over power and the need for inclusive governance and institutional reform.