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Can Access to Data Prevent Army Suicides?

Core Content

The document explores the potential of data-driven approaches in preventing suicide among U.S. Army soldiers, focusing on the Commander’s Risk Reduction Dashboard (CRRD) as a key initiative. It evaluates the usefulness of data in identifying individual and unit-level suicide risk factors and provides expert recommendations on how leaders should interpret and act on such data.

Key Findings

• Data on suicide risk indicators can be useful for leaders in developing prevention and intervention strategies, but guidance on interpretation and action is essential.
• Confidentiality is paramount when dealing with individual soldier data.
• Root cause analysis is recommended for units with atypically high prevalence of risk factors to determine if the data reflects real behavior or increased surveillance.
• Trend data at the unit level has limited utility due to the rarity of suicide and the transient nature of unit personnel.
• The CRRD, launched in 2014, aims to help leaders detect and track unit-level risk behaviors and identify high-risk soldiers.

Main Recommendations

1. For Individual Soldier Risk

• Consult behavioral health experts first to interpret the data and develop appropriate strategies.
• Avoid stigmatizing the soldier by not discussing the suicide attempt directly unless the soldier brings it up.
• Integrate the soldier into the unit following standard procedures, ensuring they are treated no differently than other new soldiers.
• Use routine leadership practices such as meeting with new soldiers, ensuring awareness of on-base resources, and following up on their assimilation.
• Notify superiors up the chain of command, but not subordinates, to maintain confidentiality and trust.
• Selective sharing with a close-knit group (e.g., company commanders, chaplains) is advised to protect the soldier's privacy.

2. For Unit-Level Risk

• Avoid routine actions based solely on unit-level data, as it may be misleading due to variations in data collection practices and personnel turnover.
• Conduct root cause analysis to determine whether the data reflects real issues or increased monitoring.
• Compare data at the battalion level to identify atypically high risk factors, as this is the smallest unit where minor changes do not significantly affect averages.
• Investigate leadership or cultural factors when a unit shows atypically high levels across multiple risk factors.
• Consider external investigations if internal analysis is insufficient, such as involving the Army’s Office of the Inspector General.

Key Risk Factors Identified

The following five risk factors were identified as most useful for identifying suicide risk in individual soldiers:

Risk Factor	Possible Data Sources
Suicidality and mental health status	Medical records, self-report, family report, police report, incident report, unit leader emails, social media activity
Behavioral health status	Guilt, hopelessness, statements of futility, substance abuse, mental health diagnosis
Relationship problems	Change of next-of-kin status
Legal problems	Domestic violence, personal violence, sexual assault
Financial problems	Credit scores, banking records, change of employment status, change in security clearance

Expert Panel Process

The study involved a three-phase consensus-building process:

1. Phase 1: Experts identified the most useful risk factors and data elements for individual soldier risk assessment.
2. Phase 2: Experts evaluated how to assess unit-level suicide risk and determine if a unit has an atypically high prevalence of risk factors.
3. Phase 3: Experts interpreted hypothetical battalion-level suicide trend data and recommended actions based on that.

Contextual Considerations

• Contextual information (e.g., date of attempt, number of attempts, method used) may help in assessing risk, but it is not necessary for unit leaders to interpret this information.
• Data interpretation should be left to behavioral health professionals, not unit leaders, to ensure accuracy and sensitivity.
• Historical comparisons within units are not recommended due to frequent personnel changes.

Broader Implications

• The methodology and findings are relevant not only to the CRRD but also to other data-driven initiatives in the U.S. Department of Defense, such as the Wellness Assessment and Risk Nexus.
• Replicating the expert elicitation process with different groups would improve the validity of the recommendations.

Conclusion

While data can be a valuable tool in suicide prevention, its utility depends on how it is interpreted and used. Army leaders must collaborate with behavioral health experts, maintain confidentiality, and avoid stigmatization. At the unit level, data should be used to raise awareness and support analysis, rather than trigger immediate interventions. The study emphasizes the need for guidance and training to ensure that leaders can effectively use data for suicide prevention.