2010年-IMF国际货币组织全球_IMF_Governance_Reform_20页_851kb

IMF Governance Reform Summary

I. Introduction

The IMF governance reform debate, which includes issues beyond quotas such as ministerial engagement, Fund management selection, and Board structure, has not yet achieved a broad consensus at the Executive Board. Despite high expectations from political circles and civil society, the lack of progress reflects multiple factors, including doubts about the importance of governance reform compared to quota changes, disagreements over reform specifics, and concerns about the "package approach" that could delay the quota rebalancing process.

The paper outlines key governance issues—excluding quotas—and proposes reforms that can be considered in parallel with quota adjustments. It emphasizes the need for a more inclusive and effective governance structure that enhances institutional legitimacy and effectiveness.

II. Enhancing Ministerial Engagement and Oversight

A. The "International Monetary and Financial Board" (IMFB) Proposal

• Basic Idea: A new ministerial-level organ, the IMFB, is proposed to be established under the IMF Articles. It would resemble the IMFC but also have decision-making powers.
• Decision-Making Authority: The IMFB would be authorized to make decisions that are currently reserved for the Board of Governors, such as quota adjustments and SDR allocations. Some powers currently held by the Executive Board, like the selection of the Managing Director and strategic aspects of global surveillance, would also be transferred.
• Strategic Direction: The IMFB would provide strategic guidance, particularly on global crisis response and the establishment of extraordinary lending facilities.
• Oversight: The IMFB would oversee the Executive Board's activities and provide accountability through ex-post reports to the Board of Governors.
• Voting Majorities: Special majorities (70% or 85% of total voting power) would be required for key decisions, ensuring broad consensus.
• Voting: Split voting is allowed, but decisions are expected to be made by consensus.
• Size and Composition: The IMFB would mirror the Executive Board in size and composition, with each member appointing one Governor, one Alternate, and three Associates, including the Executive Director. The number of Associates could be adjusted by a 70% majority.
• Constituencies: Each constituency would determine how its representatives are selected, with multi-country constituencies needing to establish coordination processes for IMFB meetings.
• Chair: The Chair would be selected from IMFB Members, not the Managing Director. The Managing Director would assist in agenda preparation, and deputies could have a more explicit role in setting the agenda.
• Meetings: The IMFB would meet at least twice a year, with the Managing Director participating but not voting. More frequent meetings and a process for voting without a meeting are also proposed.
• Amending the Articles: The IMFB would be established immediately upon the entry into force of the amendment, and the IMFC would be abolished. The delegation of authority would occur when the amendment is implemented.

B. IMFC—Improving the Status Quo

• Fallback Option: If the IMFB is not established, further reforms of the IMFC could be considered.
• Term Limits: A term limit of up to 2 years for the IMFC chair could promote rotation and continuity, with an overlapping period of 6 months for the incoming chair.
• Deputies' Meetings: Deputies could play a more active role in agenda-setting and communiqué preparation, requiring earlier consultation and background material sharing.

C. Broader Structures for the Long-Run

• Coordinated Global Governance: Coordination among ministerial fora (e.g., IMF and G-20) is essential to avoid repetition and conflicting messages. An overarching decision-making body, such as the Global Economic Coordination Council, could be considered to internalize issues and provide guidance.
• Leaders' Level Engagement: The need for high-level engagement and the extent of specialization and division of labor will influence the design of such a body.

III. Executive Board: Size, Composition, and Efficiency

• Overview: There is consensus on the need for a strong Executive Board that oversees technical work and brings member voices into the process. However, there is disagreement over the appropriate size and composition.

• Size: Proposals to reduce the Board size from 24 to 20 have been considered, but a small reduction may not meaningfully increase efficiency and could disrupt current inertial forces. Larger reductions (to 10-12) are politically unlikely.

• Composition: Moving to an all-elected Board could enhance inclusivity and representation, especially for EMDCs. This would require amending the Articles to eliminate the current dual system of appointed and elected Executive Directors.

• Voting Rules:

  • Present System: Voting percentages for Executive Directors are limited to 4–9% of eligible votes.
  • Modified System: With an all-elected Board, these limits would apply to the total voting power of the Fund.
  • Upper Limit: A 6% limit on multi-country constituencies' voting power is proposed, based on the 95th percentile of current distribution. This would prevent large shareholders from forming dominant constituencies.
  • Lower Limit: A 2% limit could be established, which corresponds to the 5th percentile of current distribution.
  • Flexibility: The Board of Governors should retain the authority to adjust voting limits, and such changes could require a 70% majority of total voting power.

• Second Alternate Executive Director: This would allow for greater flexibility in multi-country constituencies without increasing the size of Directors' offices.

IV. Management and Staff

• Management Selection: The paper proposes options for open and transparent selection of the Managing Director, with the IMFB having the authority to make this decision by a 70% majority.
• Staff Diversity: Enhancing diversity in terms of nationality, education, experience, and gender is discussed as an important step towards more inclusive governance.

V. Next Steps

• If the Board discussion yields progress, staff could prepare a follow-up paper for consideration in August/September.
• A status report from the Managing Director on quota and governance reform would be prepared ahead of the Annual Meetings.