2014年-EBA欧洲银行管理局_3L3-TF-on-PRIPs_Final-Report_43页_425kb

Summary of the 3L3 Task Force Report on Packaged Retail Investment Products (PRIPs)

Core Content

This report outlines the findings and recommendations of the 3L3 Task Force on Packaged Retail Investment Products (PRIPs), established to develop a common regulatory framework for consumer protection across the EU. The Task Force was created to align the work of the CEBS, CEIOPS, and CESR committees, and to ensure consistency in the regulation of PRIPs.

Main Objectives

The Task Force focused on three central areas:

• Scope of the PRIPs regime
• Product disclosure requirements
• Regulation of selling practices

Key Points

1. Scope of PRIPs

• Definition: A PRIP is a product where the amount payable to the investor is exposed to (a) fluctuation in the market value of assets or (b) payouts from assets, through a combination or wrapping of those assets, or other mechanisms than a direct holding.
• Disagreements: Some members felt the definition was too broad and suggested rephrasing to consider the level of investment risk and the principle of proportionality.
• Exclusions: Products such as fixed-rate deposits, life insurance policies with fixed payouts, and plain vanilla shares and bonds are excluded from the scope.
• Retail Element: The Task Force concluded that the definition should not be based on whether the product is marketed to retail investors, but rather on the nature of the product itself.
• Combined Sales: The concept of packaging goes beyond the simple combined sale of products. The Task Force does not consider combined sales as PRIPs unless the product is structured as a single, packaged investment.

2. Product Disclosure

• Existing Standards: The Task Force considered existing disclosure standards from the Insurance Directives, the IMD, the Prospectus Directive, the UCITS Directive, and MiFID.
• KII Document: The Task Force agreed that the concept of Key Investor Information (KII) from UCITS could be useful for PRIPs, but the content would differ due to the nature of PRIPs.
• Alignment with Prospectus: For PRIPs admitted to trading on a regulated market, KII should be aligned with the required prospectus information.
• Responsibilities: The manufacturer is responsible for producing the KII document, while the distributor is responsible for delivering it to the investor.
• Prior Approval: A majority of the Task Force does not support prior approval of the KII document, citing administrative burdens and potential regulatory arbitrage.

3. Selling Practices

• Benchmarking: The Task Force used MiFID Level 1 provisions as the benchmark for selling practices, while also considering the IMD and specific insurance and deposit-based PRIPs provisions.
• Client Categorisation: MiFID-style client categorisation is not considered necessary for insurance-based PRIPs, as the regime applies only when selling to retail investors.
• Conflicts of Interest: The Task Force believes that the high-level principles on conflicts of interest do not need to be changed for PRIPs outside MiFID scope. However, some members suggest that in certain cases, avoidance of conflicts may be more appropriate than disclosure.
• Advice: Advice is defined as a personal recommendation to an investor for a specific investment. A majority of members believes that advice should not be given if the investor does not disclose all relevant information. A minority suggests that advice can be given based on known facts, but with appropriate warnings.
• Non-advised Transactions: The majority supports the sale of some PRIPs on a non-advised basis, provided that the investor is not materially disadvantaged. A minority argues that under national IMD implementations, all insurance products must be sold with advice.

Annexes

• Annex 1: Proposes a possible model for conflicts of interest in the PRIPs regime.
• Annex 2: Proposes a possible model for advice in the PRIPs regime.
• Annex 3: Proposes a possible model for inducements provisions in the PRIPs regime.

Conclusion and Recommendations

• The Task Force recommends that the Commission take into account the PRIPs regime when reviewing relevant directives such as the IMD and MiFID to ensure consistency.
• Harmonisation of regulatory powers across the EU is suggested to improve enforcement of the PRIPs regime.
• The use of a non-exhaustive white list to complement the legal definition of PRIPs was considered, but not universally supported due to concerns about market variability and potential arbitrage.
• The Task Force does not support the inclusion of guarantees in the legal definition of PRIPs, as this could create distortions and inconsistencies in investor protection.