战略与国际研究中心-Aid-Stability-and-Recovery-in-Counterterrorism-and-Warfighting_91页_7mb

Summary of "Aid, Stability, and Recovery in Counterterrorism and Warfighting"

Introduction: Meeting a New Strategic Challenge

The document outlines the complex challenges of stability and recovery in the context of counterterrorism and warfighting. It emphasizes that tactical victories alone are insufficient to address underlying issues. The key challenges include:

• Violent Islamic extremism
• Conflicts and competition with key powers (e.g., Russia, China, North Korea, Iran)
• Failed states and regimes
• Major political upheavals
• Critical religious, sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and regional tensions
• Humanitarian crises and economic instability
• Failure to adapt to technological change
• Miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation

Beyond Tactical Victory: Case-Dependent Strategic Needs

The document highlights that strategic needs in counterterrorism and warfighting go beyond military success. These include:

• Winning hearts and minds and creating popular support
• Countering threat ideology
• Ensuring wartime security and safety
• Establishing functioning governance, economy, and rule of law
• Correcting governance failures and replacing failed governments
• Meeting humanitarian needs
• Returning or relocating populations
• Addressing post-conflict sectarian, ethnic, and other critical fracture lines
• Moving toward full post-conflict recovery and reconstruction
• Creating a lasting development base

The Correlation Between Aid and Warfighting: FY1979-FY2015

The document presents data on the correlation between aid and warfighting over the years, highlighting the increase in non-military security aid. Key points include:

• Non-military security aid rose from 1% in the early 1990s to 10% in the first decade of the 2000s.
• Real-term funding levels in FY2015 are four times higher than in 1995.
• Military aid as a share of total U.S. foreign assistance decreased from one-third in FY1985 to 28% in FY2015, despite a significant increase in DOD-funded military aid, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq.
• The peak of military aid was reached in FY2007 at $18.3 billion, but it dropped by 34% in real terms by FY2015.

US Estimated War Funding by Agency in FY2001-FY2015

The funding levels for different agencies and programs are outlined, with FY2015 reflecting an amended request. The OIR (Overseas Contingency Operations) funding is excluded from the total. Key figures include:

• Total War Funding: $79.4 billion in FY2015
• State Operations and Related Accounts: $14.6 billion in FY2015
• Bilateral Economic Assistance: $16.5 billion in FY2015
• International Security Assistance: $6.8 billion in FY2015

Funding Cuts in FY2018 for State Department

The document outlines significant cuts in FY2018 compared to FY2016, particularly in areas affecting security and stability:

• Total cuts: From $35.5 billion to $25.3 billion (a 71% decrease)
• Key areas affected:
  • Peace and Security: $9.0 billion to $7.7 billion (86% cut)
  • Counterterrorism: $0.4 billion to $0.3 billion
  • Stabilization and Security Sector Reform: $9.0 billion to $6.0 billion
  • Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation: $0.4 billion to $0.6 billion
  • Investing in People (Health, Education, etc.): $10.8 billion to $7.5 billion (69% cut)
  • Economic Growth (ESF/EDDS): $4.5 billion to $1.8 billion (40% cut)
  • Humanitarian Assistance: $7.4 billion to $5.3 billion (72% cut)
  • Foreign Military Financing (FMF): $6.0 billion to $5.1 billion (85% cut)

Public Perceptions of the Importance of Sharia and Islamic Extremism

• Most Muslims (e.g., 92% in Indonesia, 91% in Iraq) believe that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilians in the name of Islam are rarely or never justified.
• Favorable views of ISIS are relatively low globally, with 94% in Jordan and virtually all in Lebanon expressing unfavorable opinions.
• Nigerian Muslims have higher favorable views of ISIS (20%) than Christians (7%), with Boko Haram aligning with ISIS.
• Nigeria and Lebanon show high levels of concern about Islamic extremism, with 68% and 67% respectively expressing very concern.
• Moderate Muslim regimes in countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Bahrain are key partners in counterterrorism efforts.

Arab Youth and Their Views on Stability, Democracy, and ISIS

• Arab youth generally prefer stability over democracy, with only Egypt seeing improvement post-Arab Spring.
• Daesh is viewed as the top obstacle to stability in the Middle East by most young Arabs.
• Job opportunities are a major concern, with fewer than half believing they exist.
• Support for human rights is broad, with strong backing for women's rights in Saudi Arabia.
• Arab youth do not support ISIS's core ideology, even if the group reduced violence.
• Corruption is perceived to be increasing, with 61% of people believing it has increased in the last year.
• Bribery is widespread, with nearly 1 in 3 people having paid a bribe.
• Governments are seen as failing to combat corruption, with 68% believing they are doing badly.
• Courts and police are seen as the most corrupt institutions, with 1 in 3 people who dealt with the courts and 1 in 4 who dealt with the police having paid bribes.
• Fear of retaliation leads to silence among corruption victims, with only 1 in 5 reporting incidents.