2014年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Recent_Fall_in_the_SDR_Interest_Rate_24页_1mb

IMF Policy Paper Summary: Recent Fall in the SDR Interest Rate—Implications and Proposed Amendments to Rule T-1

Core Content

This IMF Policy Paper discusses the implications of the recent decline in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) interest rate and proposes amendments to Rule T-1 and the burden sharing mechanism to address legal and financial concerns.

The SDR interest rate, as of October 13, 2014, had fallen to a historic low of 0.03 percent. This is due to the negative interest rates on two components of the SDR basket (three-month Eurepo and three-month Japanese Treasury discount bills), and very low rates on the other two components (three-month U.S. T-bill and three-month U.K. T-bill). The paper warns that the SDR interest rate could fall further, potentially reaching zero or negative levels, which would raise legal and financial issues.

Main Issues

1. Legal Consistency with the Articles of Agreement

   • The current formula in Rule T-1 could result in a zero or negative SDR interest rate, but the Fund has no authority under the Articles to establish such a rate.
   • A zero or negative rate would contradict the Articles, which require the Fund to pay interest on SDR holdings and charges on net cumulative SDR allocations.
   • A negative rate would reverse the payer-payee relationship, which is not permissible under the Articles.
   • The ceiling and floor provisions for remuneration rates could not be effectively applied with a zero or negative SDR interest rate.
   • There is no historical precedent for zero or negative SDR rates in the Articles or its amendments.

2. Impact on the Burden Sharing Mechanism

   • The burden sharing mechanism, designed to offset the impact of unpaid charges on the Fund's income, requires a minimum positive SDR interest rate to function.
   • The current minimum SDR interest rate of 0.03 percent is below the threshold needed to allow symmetric burden sharing adjustments.
   • The mechanism is constrained by the 85 percent floor on the remuneration coefficient and the 1 basis point minimum adjustment.
   • If the burden sharing mechanism cannot operate symmetrically, the Fund may have to consider asymmetric adjustments or carry forward unpaid charges, which could impact the carrying value of credit outstanding and raise concerns about impairment under IFRS.

Key Proposals

The paper proposes the following amendments to Rule T-1 and the burden sharing mechanism:

1. Introduce a Minimum Positive Floor for the SDR Interest Rate

   • The SDR interest rate should be set at a minimum of 0.050 percent (5 basis points) to ensure it remains positive and consistent with the Articles.
   • This floor would prevent the SDR interest rate from reaching zero or negative levels.

2. Change the Rounding Rules

   • The SDR interest rate and burden sharing adjustment should be rounded to three decimal places instead of two, which is more common in low interest rate environments.
   • This would allow for more precise adjustments and enable the burden sharing mechanism to function even at very low SDR rates.

3. Reduce the Minimum Burden Sharing Adjustment

   • The minimum burden sharing adjustment should be reduced from 1 basis point to 0.1 basis point.
   • This would provide more flexibility in adjusting the remuneration and charge rates.

These changes aim to preserve the Fund's ability to maintain a minimal burden sharing capacity while aligning the SDR interest rate with the legal constraints of the Articles of Agreement.

Implications of the Proposed Changes

• The changes would be adopted by a 70 percent majority of the total voting power.
• The impact on the Fund's finances is expected to be modest.
• An annual increase in charges paid by borrowers and remuneration paid to creditors is estimated at around SDR 8 million.
• The paper suggests that the proposed changes would not significantly affect the operations of SDR users and would not impact the Fund's income, as the Board will review the Fund's income position again in April 2015.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that the third proposed approach—introducing a 5 basis point floor on the SDR interest rate and adjusting the rounding rules and minimum burden sharing adjustment—would be the most effective in addressing the current challenges. It would ensure the SDR interest rate remains positive, preserve the burden sharing mechanism, and align the Fund's operations with the legal framework.