美联储-重新连接回购（英）-2025_92页_1mb

Market Structure: The tri-party repo market integrates a decentralized over-the-counter segment with a centrally cleared interdealer market. Strategic interactions among dealers in the OTC market, amplified by the network wiring, lead to market inefficiencies and instability.

Key Findings:

• Centralized clearing coordinates dealers but introduces sensitivity to supply shocks, exacerbating instability.
• Repo market turmoil in September 2019 stemmed from large supply shocks and inelastic dealer demand, amplified by strategic interactions.
• Lender supply is less elastic than dealer demand, highlighting potential inefficiencies from crowding out private relationships.

Empirical Analysis:

• Supply and demand elasticities estimated: Lenders’ supply elasticity is higher than dealers’ demand elasticity.
• Dealer demand is substantially more inelastic than lender supply, with idiosyncratic demand shocks affecting rates indirectly.

Policy Implications:

• The Standing Repo Facility (SRF) provides a liquidity buffer but risks displacing private funding relationships if not optimally calibrated.
• Results suggest a trade-off between liquidity support and market efficiency.

Market Wiring: Asymmetries in the market wiring (e.g., centrality of counterparties) influence how supply and demand shocks propagate, contributing to market fragmentation and inefficiency.

Conclusion: The model demonstrates that while central clearing improves liquidity coordination with short-term benefits, it can amplify supply sensitivities. Policy interventions must balance market functionality with relationship-based intermediation.