2007年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Further_Consideration_of_a_New_Liquidity_Instrument_for_Market_Access_Countries_25页_288kb

Summary of the Document: Further Consideration of a New Liquidity Instrument for Market Access Countries—Design Issues

Core Content

This document outlines the IMF's consideration of a new liquidity instrument, the Reserve Augmentation Line (RAL), aimed at market access countries. The RAL is designed to prevent capital account crises rather than merely contain them, offering an alternative to costly self-insurance. It is intended to complement national efforts and enhance the Fund's crisis prevention framework, especially following the expiration of the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) in 2003.

The RAL is proposed to be part of the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), with similar charges and maturities. It would provide initial access of 300% of quota, with potential for additional financing depending on the member's progress and the outcome of post-drawing reviews. The design of the RAL focuses on qualification criteria, monitoring structure, and terms of access, while also addressing relationships with other Fund instruments and the private sector.

Main Points and Key Issues

Qualification Criteria

• The RAL is intended for members with sound fundamentals, strong policy credibility, and proven commitment to reducing vulnerabilities.
• The four key qualification criteria are:
  1. No need: The member is not expected to need Fund resources immediately.
  2. Good policies: The member has and maintains strong macroeconomic management and policies aimed at reducing vulnerabilities.
  3. Sustainable debt: The member must have a debt sustainability analysis showing a high probability of maintaining sustainable debt levels.
  4. Transparency: The member must demonstrate transparent reporting of economic data, including adherence to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and other transparency codes.

Monitoring Structure

• A semi-annual review of the member's macroeconomic policies and progress in reducing vulnerabilities would be required.
• The monitoring would include quantitative indicators such as GDP growth, inflation, public debt ratios, and exchange rate regimes.
• The Board would be involved early in the qualification process to ensure transparency and informed decision-making.

Access and Terms

• The initial access would be 300% of quota, with the option for additional financing up to 100–200% of quota, contingent on a post-drawing review.
• The RAL is not automatic, and front-loaded access is justified by the member's strong position and credible policy commitments.
• The commitment fee would reflect the Fund's costs, and the existing fee structure (reduced in 2000) would be maintained at least initially.

Relation to Other Fund Instruments

• The RAL differs from traditional Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) and CCL in that it is not for immediate balance of payments needs, but for precautionary purposes.
• It would not be subject to a global cap, but instead be reviewed based on experience (e.g., when RAL usage reaches SDR 30 billion).
• The RAL would not replace private sector contingent credit lines, but rather complement them by providing fresh, unhedged resources during crises.

Moral Hazard Considerations

• The RAL is designed to reduce moral hazard by emphasizing pre-crisis policy credibility and selectivity.
• The Fund has historically exercised selectivity in its support, and the monitoring and qualification framework is intended to ensure responsible use of the instrument.
• A sunset clause is proposed, though not recommended, to prevent the Fund from maintaining unused facilities. If included, it should be long-term (e.g., 8–10 years).

Next Steps and Recommendations

• The paper does not propose a concrete plan for the RAL but aims to further converge views on its design.
• A short paper outlining the steps to establish the RAL and modifications to existing policies would be prepared following the Board discussion.
• The decision to proceed would depend on Board views and IMFC support, and there is consideration of waiting until there is greater interest in the instrument to avoid reputational risks and ensure effective design.

Conclusion

The RAL represents a new approach to crisis prevention by the IMF, focusing on precautionary liquidity support and policy credibility. It is intended to enhance the Fund's role in supporting members' efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate moral hazard. The design process involves outreach, qualification, monitoring, and terms of access, with the aim of creating a disciplined, transparent, and effective instrument.