国际清算银行-全球公共产品、财政政策协调和世界经济中的福利（英）-2023.6-45页_747kb

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This paper analyzes strategic interactions between national fiscal authorities in a two-region, endogenous growth model of the world economy with local and global public goods. The model studies distortions to finance infrastructure investment domestically and fund a global public health fund for vaccine production.

Key findings show that under financial autarky, non-cooperative (Nash) tax policies may lead to inefficient outcomes due to cross-border externalities, especially for global public goods. Cooperation improves welfare by internalizing these spillovers, but optimal tax rates under cooperation are not necessarily higher than under non-cooperation, depending on the balance between health preferences and economic factors.

Under financial openness, capital mobility exacerbates distortions under non-cooperation, but cooperation mitigates them by preserving the tax base through internalized cross-border leakages. The welfare gains from cooperation are substantial, particularly when there are externalities associated with local public goods.

A wealth tax on capital is shown to be a viable tool for financing global public goods, even under financial integration, as it avoids distortions and can mitigate incentives for capital flight. The paper emphasizes that cooperation is beneficial for providing global public goods, and a well-designed wealth tax can effectively fund such efforts.

The analysis underscores that cooperation allows countries to internalize cross-border effects, leading to higher welfare even if tax rates change. However, the optimal policy mix depends on the specific context, including financial integration and the nature of public goods.