世界银行-规章制度、管理时间与经济发展（英）-2024.5-58页_619kb

Summary

Context:
This research examines the influence of regulatory burdens on top managers' time allocation across countries, linking it to economic development outcomes. The study highlights that managers in less developed countries spend significantly more time dealing with government rules compared to their counterparts in developed economies.

Key Findings:

1. Time Tax Across Countries:

   • The study finds a negative correlation between a country's level of development and the time managers spend on regulatory compliance. For instance, Denmark reports a ~6.4% time tax, while countries like Argentina report roughly triple that (~21.6%).
   • Control variables (firm size, industry, etc.) confirm this relationship holds, even after accounting for plant characteristics.

2. Theoretical Model:

   • A span-of-control growth model demonstrates that increased time tax reduces aggregate output, alters plant size distributions, wages, and occupational sorting.
   • Quantitative Results: Elevating Denmark's time-tax level (5%) to 15% (e.g., Argentina) reduces output by ~33% and shrinks average plant sizes by ~5 employees.

3. Policy Implications:

   • Adopting time-tax structures from developed countries could yield substantial output gains (~50% in Argentina vs. ~80% in Turkey).
   • Reducing time taxes may explain a significant portion (42.7%) of output variance across countries, independent of capital and labor allocations.

Methodology:
I analyzed data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and calibrated a growth model to Denmark’s regulatory environment. The model incorporates managerial hierarchies, task complexity, and equilibrium adjustments under varying time-tax regimes.

Contribution:
The paper provides a novel explanation for observed disparities in plant sizes and total factor productivity (TFP) across nations, emphasizing the role of institutional friction (time-tax) rather than solely factor misallocation.