2009年-世界发展银行全球_A_State_Trading_Enterprise_for_Grains_in_Russia__Issues_and_Options_58页_310kb

Summary of Document: A State Trading Enterprise for Grains in Russia?

Core Content

This document, authored by the World Bank and published in October 2009, examines the potential implications of establishing a State Trading Enterprise (STE) for grains in Russia, specifically the proposed "United Grain Company" (UGC). It evaluates the impact of such an enterprise on domestic and international grain markets, drawing on global experiences from Canada and Australia.

Main Findings

• Market Power and Rents: The potential for the UGC to exert market power and generate rents depends on the rights and privileges it is granted. These could influence production, consumption, trade, and prices.
• Global Interest: The establishment of the UGC is of global interest due to Russia's role as a major grain exporter and the concerns raised by international observers about its potential to control world grain prices.
• Short-Term Influence vs. Long-Term Control: While the UGC could have significant short-term influence on global grain prices, it is unlikely to control world markets in the long run due to the diversification of grain exports and the challenges of forming a global cartel.
• Price Discrimination: The UGC's ability to engage in price discrimination is limited by the structure of Russian grain markets and the lack of exclusive export rights. Price discrimination strategies could lead to inefficiencies and reduced competitiveness.
• Competition and Efficiency: Maintaining effective competition is crucial for the efficiency of the Russian grain market. A monopolistic structure, even if not explicitly granted, could lead to reduced incentives for producers and lower returns.
• Infrastructure and Public Goods: Supporting investments in infrastructure such as rail systems and waterways can enhance the efficiency of the grain marketing system.
• WTO Considerations: The UGC may be classified as an STE under WTO rules, which could have implications for Russia's trade negotiations. Russia is not currently a WTO member, and its plans could affect future accession talks.
• Alternative Scenarios: The document considers alternative or complementary scenarios to the UGC's structure, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach to state involvement in grain trade.

Key Options and Economic Impact

The document outlines several options for Russia's state involvement in grain trade:

1. Attainment of Global Market Control: Unlikely due to the diversified nature of global grain markets and the lack of necessary supply discipline.
2. Reducing Market Share and Crowding Out Foreign Traders: Could lead to reduced competition, lower efficiency, and negative impacts on domestic producers.
3. Lowering Prices for Consumers and Increasing Food Security: May be achieved through export regulation, but this approach can also reduce producer incentives and investments.
4. Increasing Export Margins: This would require the UGC to have a monopoly on exports, which is not currently planned.
5. Increasing Efficiency of the Grain Marketing System: Could be beneficial if the UGC exploits economies of scale, but evidence from Australia and Canada suggests that STEs may not always lead to efficiency gains.

Global Evidence

• Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) and Australian Wheat Board (AWB) are cited as examples of STEs.
• Market Power: Both CWB and AWB had some market power due to their single-desk status, but their success in extracting price premiums is not well-documented.
• Cost and Efficiency: There is evidence that these boards increased marketing costs and did not always achieve efficiency gains.
• Export Restrictions: While export restrictions can temporarily lower domestic prices and increase food security, they are costly and can reduce long-term productivity and innovation.

Russian Context

• Current Market Structure: The Russian grain market is already concentrated, with about 60% of exports controlled by nine firms, half of which are foreign.
• UGC Structure: The UGC is expected to control a significant share of exports (25%) and consolidate state assets worth $300–400 million.
• Ownership Plan: The UGC is planned to have a minimum 25% state ownership, with up to 75% offered to commercial traders, preferably Russian.
• Domestic Objectives: Russia aims to increase grain production from 75 to 125 million tons by 2020 and double exports from 13 to 25 million tons annually.
• Potential Negative Impacts: The UGC could reduce competition, lower farm-gate prices, and discourage productivity-enhancing investments.

Recommendations

• Effective Competition Policy: Promoting a competitive market environment is essential to avoid negative impacts on producers and consumers.
• Grain Standards and Quality Certification: Maintaining a system that aligns with market needs can support efficient trade.
• Infrastructure Investment: Supporting public infrastructure such as rail and waterways can enhance the efficiency of the grain marketing system.
• Avoid Monopolistic Structures: A monopolistic market structure, even if not explicitly granted, could lead to inefficiencies and reduced competitiveness.
• Transparency and Regulation: The UGC's impact should be closely monitored, and its operations should be transparent and regulated to prevent trade distortions.

Conclusion

The establishment of the UGC in Russia is a significant development with potential implications for both domestic and international grain markets. While it may have a substantial role in the Russian grain export system, the likelihood of it controlling global markets is low. The document emphasizes the importance of maintaining competition, supporting infrastructure, and ensuring that the UGC operates in a manner that benefits all stakeholders.