2017年-世界发展银行全球_Rent_Creation_and_Rent_Containment___The_Political_Economy_of_Telecommunications_in_Mexico_South_Africa_and_Turkey_46页_1015kb

Summary: Rent Creation and Rent Containment in Telecommunications in Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey

Core Content

This paper explores the political economy of the telecommunications sector in three middle-income countries—Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey—focusing on the dynamics of rent creation and containment. It emphasizes the interplay between state and business actors, the role of regulatory and judicial institutions, and the impact of technological change on sectoral development and competition.

Main Questions and Themes

• How does policy change occur in real political economies?
  Policy change is shaped by the interactions between business and state actors, as well as the broader political settlement of a country. These interactions often result in regulatory and institutional design choices that reflect the political and economic priorities of the ruling elites.

• Is there a tendency for economic entrenchment in middle-income countries?
  Yes, there is a tendency for economic entrenchment, where regulatory capture and market power lead to sustained economic rents. However, countervailing forces such as regulatory reform, judicial intervention, and shifts in political currents can promote a more dynamic and competitive equilibrium.

• How is the state understood in the context of business-state relations?
  The state is not a neutral actor but is influenced by political and economic interests. Regulatory and judicial institutions may lack the autonomy to effectively check rent extraction, especially when they are subject to political pressures.

• How do technological changes interact with these processes?
  Technological change, particularly in the form of mobile and broadband services, has the potential to increase competition. However, the sector remains highly concentrated, and interactions between business, regulators, and state actors continue to shape the regulatory landscape.

Key Findings

• Sectoral Evolution:
  The telecommunications sector in all three countries has undergone significant transformation from being predominantly public to largely private. This shift occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s, driven by global trends and domestic political and economic conditions.

• Rent Creation and Containment:
  Rent creation is a central theme, with both extractive and productivity-based rents playing a role. Extractive rents are often sustained through regulatory capture and market power, while productivity rents arise from technological innovation and efficiency improvements. The paper argues that the interaction between these two forms of rent is shaped by political decisions.

• Regulatory and Judicial Institutions:
  Regulatory bodies such as the Federal Telecommunications Commission (COFETEL) in Mexico, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), and the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA) in Turkey are key players in shaping the sector. These institutions, however, are often influenced by political and economic elites, limiting their ability to act independently.

• Technological Waves:
  The sector has gone through three major technological waves: fixed line, mobile, and broadband. Each wave has had different implications for competition and regulation. While mobile and broadband have introduced more competition, the sector remains highly concentrated, and the potential for facility-based competition is constrained by political and regulatory factors.

• Performance Assessment:
  The performance of the telecommunications sector in these countries is moderately positive. There has been substantial expansion of access and adoption of new technologies, with prices remaining relatively in line with middle-income and OECD countries. However, the sector is still influenced by political and economic elites, and there are concerns about the sustainability of these gains.

• Political Risks:
  The paper warns that the gains made in the sector depend on political support. In all three countries, there are significant political forces that could undermine the progress made, including populist, clientelistic, and authoritarian tendencies.

Key Actors and Institutions

• Sectoral Regulators:

  • Mexico: Federal Telecommunications Commission (COFETEL), later replaced by the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) in 2013.
  • South Africa: Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA).
  • Turkey: Information and Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA).

• Competition Authorities:

  • Mexico: Federal Competition Commission (CFC).
  • South Africa: Competition Commission.
  • Turkey: Competition Authority.

• Judicial Bodies:

  • Mexico: Appeals courts and Supreme Court.
  • South Africa: Magistrates courts, High Court, and Supreme Court.
  • Turkey: Constitutional Court and Council of State.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that while the telecommunications sector in Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey has seen improvements in access, efficiency, and competition, these gains are still heavily influenced by political and economic elites. The role of checks and balances institutions and regulatory reforms has been crucial in promoting more competitive and dynamic processes. However, the sustainability of these reforms depends on continued political support, which remains a critical factor in the sector's future development.