斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-Transfers-of-small-arms-and-light-weapons-to-fragile-states_-Strengthening-oversight-and-control_20页_522kb

Summary of Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons to Fragile States: Strengthening Oversight and Control

Core Content

This paper examines the risks and mitigation strategies associated with the transfer of small arms and light weapons (SALW) to fragile states and highlights the importance of strengthening oversight and control mechanisms to prevent these transfers from contributing to conflict, instability, and corruption.

The study focuses on eight fragile states—Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and South Sudan—during the period 2002–2012. These states were selected based on their involvement in stabilization initiatives and security sector reform (SSR) rather than the presence of armed conflict.

Main Risks Identified

• Post-shipment diversion: Arms and ammunition are often transferred to unauthorized actors, such as rebel groups, terrorist organizations, or private militias, undermining stabilization efforts and contributing to conflict.
• Restart or intensify conflict: Arms transfers can exacerbate existing tensions or trigger new conflicts, especially when they occur in politically sensitive periods like elections or in the context of rival security agencies.
• Corruption: Procurement processes in the defense sector are vulnerable to corrupt practices, particularly due to the high value of contracts, lack of transparency, and limited oversight.

Key Examples

• Afghanistan and Iraq: Highlighted as the most significant cases of arms diversion and corruption. In both countries, arms were frequently found in the hands of unauthorized groups, and procurement processes were marred by fraudulent practices and lack of accountability.
• Somalia: Arms supplied to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) were widely diverted to the open market and opposition groups. UN reports indicated that up to half of the ammunition distributed was being misused.
• DRC and South Sudan: Arms deliveries to national security forces led to conflicts with UN-embargoed groups. In South Sudan, weapons were reportedly used against opposition forces in Unity state, causing civilian casualties.
• Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste: Corruption in procurement processes and the continued use of brokers with questionable backgrounds were identified as major concerns.

Risk-Mitigation Measures

• Multilateral notification systems: These are used to increase transparency and ensure that arms transfers are monitored. They are particularly important for preventing arms from reaching unauthorized actors.
• Control and oversight of delivery: Strengthening the control over the delivery and storage of arms can reduce the risk of diversion and misuse.
• Stockpile management and marking: Ensuring proper handling and marking of imported arms can help track their use and prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.
• Surplus destruction: Disposing of surplus arms can reduce the risk of their being used in conflict.
• Improving recipient states' procurement standards: Enhancing the capacity of fragile states to manage arms procurement responsibly is critical for long-term stability.

Recommendations

• Strengthen international oversight: Donors and suppliers should work together to ensure that arms transfers are transparent and monitored.
• Enhance local capacity: Fragile states must be empowered to manage their own security forces and arms procurement processes.
• Improve accountability: There should be greater emphasis on vetting suppliers and brokers, as well as ensuring that procurement procedures are free from corruption.
• Consider regional cooperation: Regional systems, such as ECOWAS, can play a role in monitoring and managing SALW transfers.
• Design SSR programs with caution: The lessons from these cases should inform future stabilization and security sector reform initiatives, especially in the Middle East and North Africa and ongoing efforts in Africa and Asia.

Conclusion

The paper underscores that while the provision of arms and ammunition to fragile states is necessary for security and development, it must be accompanied by robust oversight and control mechanisms to prevent negative impacts on conflict dynamics, governance, and stability. The examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and South Sudan illustrate the potential for misuse and the need for international cooperation and local accountability in arms transfer processes.