【四川大学（王杨）】四川大学（王杨）：2024基于谐波状态空间的新型电力系统宽频扰动建模与分析报告_48页_19mb

Summary of "Cyber-Physical Power System Modelling and Digital Co-Simulation"

Core Content

This document presents a comprehensive overview of Cyber-Physical Power System (CPPS) Modelling and Digital Co-Simulation research conducted by Prof. Xin Zhang at the University of Sheffield, UK. The focus is on integrating cyber and physical systems in power grids, with an emphasis on real-time simulation, security analysis, and attack detection in microgrids. The research also highlights the Sheffield Power System Research Facility, which includes a strong industrial collaboration network and access to advanced simulation tools.

Main Points

1. Sheffield Power System Research

• Research Focus: Cyber-physical power system simulation, with an emphasis on real-time digital co-simulation.
• Funding and Collaboration:
  • UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship: £1,800,000 + £800,000 (4+3 years)
  • EPSRC New Investigator Award: £500,000 (3 years)
  • The Control and Power Systems Laboratory has attracted over £5m in research funding.
• Industrial Partnerships: Strong collaboration with National Grid, Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy, and other industry leaders. The lab hosts multiple industry and government-funded research centres and platforms.
• Research Facilities:
  • 6 x Opal-RT real-time digital simulators (RT-LAB, ePHYSORSIM)
  • 2 x Typhoon HIL simulators (HIL 602, HIL 402)
  • Integration of physical and cyber systems using real-time simulation platforms.

2. Cyber-Physical Power System Digital Co-Simulation

• Co-Simulation Architecture:
  • Combines power, communication, and information systems.
  • Involves mutual dependencies and dynamic variable exchanges at every time step.
  • Two main options:
    • Option 1: Single simulator for both power and communication systems, with virtual links and no external hardware required.
    • Option 2: Different simulators with synchronization, data exchange, and delay handling.
• Platform Components:
  • Power System Simulators: RT-LAB, Typhoon HIL, and others for RMS and EMT simulations.
  • Communication Network Simulators: EXata and OMNeT++ for network modeling and analysis.
  • Co-simulation Interface: Python-based for data exchange between continuous-time power systems and discrete-event communication systems.
• Key Case Studies:
  • Dropped Data Contingency: Demonstrates how data loss in communication links can be simulated and analyzed.
  • Network Latency & Re-Routing Strategy under DoS Attack: Highlights the impact of network latency on microgrid control and the effectiveness of re-routing strategies.
  • False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs): Focuses on detecting and mitigating attacks on primary and secondary controllers.

3. Cyber-Physical Power System Modelling

• Modelling Approaches:
  • Modelling of Cyber-Physical Power Network: Integration of physical and cyber components.
  • Vulnerability Assessment: Evaluates the system's susceptibility to cyber-attacks.
  • Security Dispatch: Ensures secure and efficient operation of the grid.
• Attack Detection:
  • Watermarking Embedded in Unknown Input Observer (UIO): A novel method for detecting FDIAs.
  • Residual-based Detection: Uses residuals from state estimation and control algorithms to identify anomalies.
  • Recursive Watermarking Technique: Incorporates previous watermark data to enhance detection capabilities.
• Mathematical Framework:
  • State-space models for DERs (Distributed Energy Resources).
  • UIO-based state estimation with watermarking to improve detection accuracy.
  • Theoretical bounds and conditions for residual variation and attack detection.

Key Information

• Research Team: Led by Prof. Xin Zhang, with a team of 16 academics, 26 post-doctoral researchers, 80 PhD students, and 3 technicians.
• Tools and Technologies:
  • Opal-RT: Real-time digital simulators.
  • Typhoon HIL: Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simulators.
  • EXata: Communication network simulator.
  • KEYSIGHT: Used in communication and control simulations.
• Security Considerations:
  • Cyber-attacks on microgrids, particularly on primary and secondary control systems.
  • Vulnerabilities in communication protocols (e.g., Modbus) and IoT technologies.
  • Importance of network latency and re-routing strategies in mitigating DoS attacks.
• Theoretical Contributions:
  • Lemma 1: Provides a bound on residual variation due to watermarking.
  • Theorem 1: Establishes conditions for effective attack detection using UIO and watermarking.

Conclusion

The research at the University of Sheffield emphasizes the integration of cyber and physical systems in power grids, particularly in the context of microgrids and renewable energy transitions. Through the development of a Cyber-Physical Digital Co-Simulation Platform, the work addresses the challenges of real-time simulation, network latency, and cyber-attack detection, offering a robust framework for secure and resilient power system operations. The use of watermarking embedded in UIO significantly enhances the ability to detect false data injection attacks without degrading control performance.