战略与国际研究中心-The-Changing-Iraqi-Order-of-Battle_-A-Guesstimate_8页_94kb

CSIS: The Changing Iraqi Order of Battle Summary

Core Content

This document, titled "The Changing Iraqi Order of Battle: A Guest Estimate", provides an analysis of the military structure and forces of Iraq prior to the 2003 invasion. It outlines the distribution and composition of the Iraqi military, including regular army forces, Republican Guards, and various internal security and popular mobilization units. The document is based on intelligence assessments and is intended to offer a snapshot of Iraq's military capabilities and strategic positioning at the time.

Main Points

1. Order of Battle Overview

• The Iraqi military is divided into regular army forces and Republican Guards.
• The Republican Guards are a key component, with a total strength of 60,000 to 70,000 men.
• Forces are distributed across Northern, Eastern, Southern, and Baghdad/Tikrit regions.

2. Northern Forces

• 1st Corps: Headquartered in Kirkuk, includes 2 mechanized and 6 infantry divisions.
  • 1st Corps: 1 mech division, 3 infantry divisions.
  • 5th Corps: 1 mech division, 3 infantry divisions.
• Republican Guards (Northern Corps): 1 armored and 1 infantry division, stationed in Tikrit and Baghdad.
• Key movements: The 1st Adnan Mechanized Division is moving south, possibly toward Baghdad.

3. Eastern Forces

• 2nd Corps: Headquartered in Deyala, includes 1 armored and 2 infantry divisions.
  • 3rd Armored Division, 15th Infantry Division, and 34th Infantry Division.
• Positioned to defend against Iranian-backed opposition and potential attacks.

4. Southern Forces

• 3rd Corps: Headquartered in Nasseria, includes 1 armored, 1 mechanized, and 1 infantry division.
  • 6th Armored Division, 11th Infantry Division, and 51st Mechanized Division.
• These forces may retreat into the Sunni Triangle in case of a US-British attack.

5. Republican Guards Structure

• 2nd Corps (Southern): Headquartered in Al Hafreia, includes the al Madina al Munawara Armored Division and other divisions.
• Special Republican Guards: 4 brigades, 14 battalions, responsible for defending the regime and protecting Saddam.
• These forces are stationed in Baghdad, Tikrit, and Kirkuk, and have a specialized role in internal security and coup prevention.

6. Internal Security and Military Intelligence

• Military Intelligence Service (MIS): 3,000–6,000 men, responsible for covert operations, infiltrating opposition, and internal security.
• Special Branch of MIS (Unit 999): Deeply infiltrates the Kurdish enclave.
• Opposition Battalion: Operates in various regions, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, and riverine/mine operations.
• Military Security Service (Amn al Askariyya): 6,000 men, responsible for subversion detection and internal security, with a prison function in the Bataween district.

Key Information

7. Popular Mobilization Forces

• These include non-military forces that may be used to supplement regular military units.
• Fedayeen Saddam: A personal militia of up to 30,000–40,000 men, originally formed by Uday in 1995, later controlled by Qusay and later Uday again.
  • Operates outside the law, with a death squadron responsible for executions.
• Lions of Saddam: A paramilitary training program for ages 10–16, potentially useful in urban warfare.
• National Defense Battalions: Includes Kurdish militia forces from tribes loyal to Saddam, such as the Zibar and Herki.
• Jerusalem (Al Quds) Brigades: A volunteer force with 7 million claimed members, though likely exaggerated.
  • May include loyalists and youth in Sunni areas.
• Youth (Civil Defense) Force: A 1999 formation of 12–17 year olds, intended for city defense.
• Great Retaliation Force: A propaganda force with limited armed elements, possibly used to counter Kurdish threats.

8. Strategic Implications

• The Iraqi military is dispersed, with forces moving outside their peacetime locations.
• The Republican Guards are central to the regime's security, with dual roles in internal and external defense.
• Loyalty is a key factor, with tribal and personal militias playing a significant role in urban warfare and internal stability.
• Saddam's strategy includes frequent changes in leadership to prevent the consolidation of power and maintain control over the security apparatus.

Conclusion

The document highlights the complex and dispersed nature of Iraq's military structure in early 2003, emphasizing the importance of internal security and popular mobilization in maintaining regime stability. It underscores the strategic positioning of forces in key regions and the role of Saddam's personal network in securing loyalty and control. The analysis serves as a pre-invasion assessment of Iraq's military readiness and potential resistance strategies.