法国战略研究基金会-欧洲的核威慑：趋同点，奇异点和合作前景（英文）-2021.1-17页_2mb

Summary of "Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: Points of Convergence, Singularities and Prospects for Cooperation"

Introduction

Nuclear deterrence has become a more prominent topic in European strategic affairs over the past decade, especially in the context of growing tensions between major powers and the collapse of arms control agreements. While some European countries, such as Austria, Ireland, and Malta, have taken a strong stance against nuclear weapons by ratifying the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), others, including the UK and France, maintain a commitment to nuclear deterrence as a key element of national and collective security. The paper explores the differing positions among European states, the role of NATO in nuclear strategy, and the implications of these strategies on European defence cooperation and capabilities.

1. Nuclear Deterrence in Europe: A Contrasting Picture

1.1. Different Positions and Singularities

European states exhibit diverse views on nuclear deterrence, even among those with similar security interests:

• France and the UK: Both are recognized nuclear powers under the NPT. France maintains a dual component (submarine and airborne) while the UK focuses solely on the submarine-based deterrent.
• NATO members: Some, like Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, host U.S. nuclear weapons as part of NATO's extended deterrence, though they do not publicly acknowledge this.
• Non-nuclear states: These include countries like Austria, Ireland, and Malta, which have ratified the TPNW, showing strong opposition to nuclear weapons.
• Intermediate positions: Countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland are in favor of disarmament but still consider nuclear deterrence as a potential stabilizing factor.

1.2. An Accepted Role for NATO's Extended Deterrence

NATO's nuclear strategy has become relatively consensual among its members, with a focus on maintaining a balance between deterrence and disarmament. Key points include:

• Strategic Concept (2010): Emphasized the importance of nuclear deterrence for Alliance security.
• Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR): Clarified that nuclear deterrence is a core component of NATO's defense posture, alongside conventional and missile defense.
• Nuclear sharing arrangements: NATO employs non-strategic nuclear capabilities, with 140–185 B61 nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, carried by fighter-bombers from several NATO members.
• Strategic cooperation: NATO members like Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands are involved in the procurement and maintenance of nuclear-capable aircraft, such as the F-35A.

1.3. Growing Reflection on the Contribution of Independent Nuclear Arsenals

France and the UK are re-evaluating the role of their independent nuclear capabilities in European security:

• France: While emphasizing sovereignty and autonomy, it acknowledges the indirect benefits of its nuclear strategy to Western Europe. President Macron has advocated for a "shared European strategic culture" and greater dialogue with European partners.
• UK: Remains integrated into NATO's nuclear deterrence, participating in nuclear planning and sharing capabilities with the U.S.
• Strategic dialogue: France has initiated discussions with interested European countries on nuclear deterrence, aiming to enhance mutual understanding without compromising its independent stance.

2. Substantial Investments to Perpetuate Capabilities in a Remodelled Strategic Environment

2.1. Participation in NATO's Nuclear Mission: A Significant Investment for Some Allies

Several European countries are investing in modernizing their military infrastructure to support NATO's nuclear mission:

• B61-12 upgrade: A key part of NATO's nuclear modernization, with deployment expected over the next five years.
• Aircraft modernization:
  • Germany: Plans to replace Tornado/Panavia 200 with Eurofighters for conventional missions and potentially with F/A-18 Super Hornets for nuclear missions.
  • Belgium: Has ordered 34 F-35s, with 15–30 potentially designated for nuclear missions.
  • Italy: Has ordered 37 F-35s, but its acquisition was canceled by the U.S. due to Turkey's S-400 purchase.
  • Netherlands and Turkey: Both have ordered F-35s, though Turkey's participation is under question due to its procurement of Russian S-400 systems.

2.2. Renewing the Components of Deterrence: Critical Choices for the UK and France

Both the UK and France are investing heavily in modernizing their nuclear capabilities:

• UK: The Dreadnought programme, costing £31–41 billion, aims to replace its aging fleet of SSBNs with new submarines by the early 2030s.
• France: The SSBN modernization programme is set to ensure deterrence until 2070, with significant investments in the early 2020s. This includes upgrades to submarines, propulsion systems, and the development of dual-capable fighter-bombers and cruise/ballistic missiles.

3. Prospects and Questions Relating to Nuclear Weapons in Europe

3.1. Variable Political Acceptability

• Anti-nuclear sentiment: Strong in several European countries, with some viewing nuclear deterrence as illegal or unacceptable.
• NATO members: While some have expressed opposition to nuclear weapons, they still support the U.S. nuclear umbrella and participate in nuclear-sharing arrangements.
• Shift in stance: Since the Ukraine crisis, many governments have become more supportive of NATO's extended deterrence, reducing the political weight of anti-nuclear movements.

3.2. Limited Prospects for Cooperation

• Sovereignty and independence: France prioritizes national sovereignty and is cautious about sharing nuclear doctrine or planning with other states.
• Cooperation with the UK: Despite some collaboration in research and development (e.g., the EPURE project), France avoids full integration into NATO's nuclear planning group.
• Industrial considerations: The procurement of foreign aircraft (e.g., F-35) raises concerns about European defense industrial autonomy and the potential exclusion of European manufacturers from future projects.

3.3. Budgetary and Industrial Issues

• High costs: The modernization of nuclear capabilities involves significant financial commitments.
• Industrial partnerships: France seeks to maintain European industrial involvement in nuclear-related projects, while other countries may be more reliant on U.S. suppliers.
• Offset agreements: Concerns exist about the terms of these agreements and their impact on European industry.

3.4. Nuclear Deterrence and New Technologies

• Technological evolution: The B61-12 represents a new generation of nuclear weapons with enhanced maneuverability and low yield.
• Integration with conventional forces: The use of dual-capable aircraft highlights the increasing integration of nuclear and conventional capabilities.
• Future systems: France is working on the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) program, aiming for a new generation of aircraft that could replace current models.

Conclusion

European states have divergent views on nuclear deterrence, with some advocating for disarmament and others maintaining or enhancing their nuclear capabilities. NATO's extended deterrence remains a central element of European security, supported by several members who host U.S. nuclear weapons. France and the UK are leading efforts to modernize their nuclear forces, with France emphasizing European strategic culture and industrial autonomy. Despite some progress in dialogue and cooperation, the political and strategic differences among European states limit the prospects for a unified approach to nuclear deterrence. The evolving strategic environment and technological advancements will continue to shape the future of nuclear policy in Europe.