IMF-美国真的摆脱了二战债务吗？（英）-2024.1-55页_1mb

The paper questions whether the U.S. debt/GDP ratio declined after World War II due to economic growth (r < g), rather than policy interventions like primary surpluses or interest rate distortions. The analysis shows that factors such as primary surpluses and financial repression (e.g., the pre-1951 Fed-Treasury interest rate peg and surprise inflation) were key drivers of the postwar debt reduction. Without these factors, the debt/GDP ratio would have fallen less significantly by 1974, from an estimated 74% instead of 23%. Since 1974, the ratio has risen due to primary deficits and average real interest rates exceeding growth rates. The paper concludes that the economy does not naturally "grow out of" high debt levels without fiscal consolidation, and policy distortions during WWII are unlikely to recur. The findings suggest that economic growth alone is insufficient to resolve debt problems.