2011年-世界发展银行全球_Managing_Public_Finance_and_Procurement_in_Fragile_and_Conflicted_Settings_35页_963kb

Summary of "Managing Public Finance and Procedure in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings"

Core Content

This document explores the challenges of managing public finance and procurement in fragile and conflict-affected states, emphasizing the disconnect between formal institutional frameworks and their actual functionality. It highlights how donor-driven reforms often fail to translate into effective outcomes due to the persistence of informal and semi-official systems that govern resource allocation and use in these contexts.

Main Points

1. PFM in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

• PFM Performance Gap: Fragile states score significantly lower on the PEFA Performance Measurement Framework (PMF) compared to non-fragile states. The average score for fragile states is 1.73, while non-fragile states score 2.26 on the 64 PFM process dimensions.
• Three Axes of PFM Performance:
  • Form vs. Function: There is a disconnect between de jure (formal) measures and de facto (functional) practices.
  • Upstream vs. Downstream: Upstream processes (budget making, planning) are more formal and better managed, whereas downstream processes (procurement, cash management) are weaker and less institutionalized.
  • Concentrated vs. Deconcentrated: Central agencies (concentrated) perform better than deconcentrated agencies (sector or local level) in PFM.

2. Institutional and Contextual Factors

• Donor Reforms: Donors often implement formal institutional reforms (legal frameworks, institutional architecture, operational systems) to improve PFM, but these reforms rarely lead to the desired outcomes.
• Formal vs. Informal Systems: In fragile states, governing elites often rely on informal and semi-official systems for managing public finance and procurement, which are more responsive to local and personal interests than formal systems.
• Legitimacy and Accountability: The legitimacy of formal institutions is undermined by perceptions of ineffectiveness and procedural injustice. Accountability mechanisms are often weak or non-existent.

3. Resource Flows and Their Impact

• Domestic Resources: These are often the first to be affected in conflict settings. Domestic revenue tends to be low and inconsistent, especially in the immediate aftermath of conflict.
• Illicit Resources: These include funds siphoned from the domestic and strategic flows, such as bribes, informal appointments, and illegal trade. Illicit flows are significant and often exceed the value of development assistance.
• Strategic Resources: Donor funds are typically higher in the immediate post-conflict period and are used to meet short-term political and security needs, often bypassing formal PFM systems.

Key Findings

• PFM in Fragile States: The PEFA framework reveals that fragile states generally perform worse on all PFM dimensions, especially in areas like transparency, procurement, and internal control.
• Resource Flow Dynamics: Strategic and illicit flows significantly influence the behavior of governing elites, often crowding out domestic revenue and undermining formal PFM systems.
• Dual Public Sector: A dual public sector emerges, with domestic and international actors managing resources separately, leading to tensions and inefficiencies in the procurement process.
• Incentives and Institutional Weakness: The effectiveness of PFM systems is undermined by the presence of informal systems and the lack of administrative capacity, creating perverse incentives for elites to prolong contest and bargaining beyond formal institutions.

Case Study: Cambodia

• Domestic Revenue Trends: Domestic revenues increased from 6.5% of GDP one year before the end of conflict to 11.7% five years later.
• Strategic and Illicit Flows: Strategic resources were high initially but declined, while illicit flows remained substantial, with annual losses estimated at $300–500 million.
• Donor Influence: Strategic flows are often managed through parallel systems that prioritize procedural controls and limit local discretion, reinforcing the dominance of formal, yet ineffective, PFM structures.

Conclusion

The central challenge in PFM interventions in fragile states is not merely the lack of formal systems, but the persistence of informal and semi-official mechanisms that shape incentives and outcomes. Donor reforms often fail to address these underlying dynamics, leading to a situation where formal systems remain symbolic rather than functional. The legitimacy and effectiveness of PFM systems depend on the ability to align formal procedures with the realities of resource flows and political contest in these contexts.